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A Critique of Anthony Giddens’ Later Works
Anthony King
Introduction
Although Anthony Giddens describes his approach as “social” rather
than “critical” theory, and although there is little obvious Frankfurt
School influence in his writing, he believes “social theory is inevitably
critical theory.”1 While he might aim at such a critical position, it is far
from obvious that he succeeds. On the contrary, his later writings have
become an apology for the status quo.2 Failing to consider his prejudices,
perhaps because he thinks critique is inevitable, Giddens has increasingly
vindicated predominant relations of domination. He celebrates the rise of
post-traditional individuals, who have the freedom of choice to create and
1. Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (London: Macmillan,
1982), p. 15.
2. Patrick Baert argues that Giddens’ career comprises four periods: the first (the
1960s) includes his articles on suicide; the second (from the beginning to the middle of the
1970s) includes his writings on Marx, Durkheim and Weber; the third (from the middle of
the 1970s until 1984 — the publication of the The Constitution of Society) includes his writ-
ings on structuration theory; and the fourth includes everything published in the late 1980s
and 1990s. See Social Theory in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 92-4.
This division is not without merit. But Giddens’ structuration theory constitutes a distinct
body of texts, published between the mid-1970s and 1984. Moreover, the first mention of
“structuration” appears in The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, which Baert consid-
ers part of his early period. Dividing Giddens into an early and a later period, situating
structuration theory at the end of his earlier period, is more straightforward, and reflects the
similar concerns and style of Giddens’ writing from the 1960s to 1984. The key division on
which this paper is based, and on which it is in agreement with both Baert and Jeffrey Alex-
ander’s “Critical Reflections on Reflexive Modernization,” in Theory, Culture and Society,
Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), is that there is a demonstrable divide in Giddens’ writing after 1984.
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re-create themselves, while reproducing the global system that has liber-
ated them. His celebration of the individual echoes dominant free market
principles, which privilege choice and consumption, and have been cen-
tral to the post-Fordist transformations in the West.
Structuration Theory
Giddens’ first serious works in the early 1970s examined the ways in
which Marx, Weber and Durkheim can contribute to an the analysis of
late 20th century society. Out of these works emerged a more focused the-
oretical interest in structure and agency and, from the mid-1970s
onwards, his structuration theory sought to overcome the dualism of
structure and agency through a synthesis of functionalism, structuralism
and interpretivist traditions. Allegedly, functionalists like Parsons and
structuralists like Levi-Strauss had overemphasized objective factors in
social life, at the cost of the individual agent, while the interactionist and
interpretive tradition, represented by Goffman and Garfinkel, did exactly
the opposite, overestimating the importance of individual agents.
Structuration theory was meant to explain how social relations stretch
across time and space to reproduce the social system through meaningful
individual action.3 To that end, Giddens postulated the notion of “the dual-
ity of structure,” whereby structure,4 consisting of “virtual” rules and
resources orienting individual action, is both the medium and the outcome
of individual actions.5 These virtual rules are problematic, but the role they
play in structuration theory is important. When individuals act, they draw
on these virtual rules to carry out certain social practices, thereby repro-
ducing the rules which were the medium of their practice in the first place.
Giddens illustrates this duality by the favored example of language use:
“when I utter a grammatical English sentence in casual conversation, I
contribute to the reproduction of the English language as a whole.”6 For
Giddens, individuals do not merely reproduce structure, the rules which
3. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 35.
4. The notion of structure originally arises in Giddens’ work out of the concept of
practical consciousness, which he distinguishes from either discursive consciousness or
the unconscious. See Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London:
Macmillan, 1988), p. 2. Whereas discursive consciousness refers to those areas of knowl-
edge of which one is aware, and the unconscious refers to subconscious motivations, prac-
tical consciousness refers to the state of consciousness in which one ordinarily lives. This
is captured best by Schutz’ notion of the “taken-for-granted.” 
5. Ibid., p. 9
6. Ibid., p. 77.
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inform action, but also the system of enduring social institutions, because
the rules ensure the appropriate routines for the system’s reproduction. By
drawing on the rules appropriate to the institutions in which individuals
find themselves, they reproduce those institutions. There is a duality, not
only of structure (rules and resources), but also of the social system (insti-
tutions), where the system’s properties become the medium and the out-
come of individual action. “One of the main propositions of structuration
theory is that the rules and resources drawn upon in the production and
reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system
reproduction (duality of structure).”7 Although, at first, it is only the rules
that are reproduced in social practice, Giddens assumes that these rules are
unproblematically connected to the wider system and, therefore, that the
system is, more or less, automatically reproduced by individual practice.
For the most part, Giddens’ structuration theory is concerned with the
system’s reproduction through individual practice, even though many of his
critics wrongly argue that structuration theory ignores the social system.8
The centrality of the individual, however, does appear at certain moments.
Having argued that the individual must be bound to the system through
structure, Giddens insists that “it is a necessary feature of action that, at any
point in time, the agent ‘could have acted otherwise’.”9 This contradicts the
rest of structuration theory, which explicitly limits the randomness of indi-
vidual action through “structure” and appears in Giddens’ writing as an
unfounded ideological assertion of Western liberal values.10 Thus, Mestro-
vic has argued that Giddens’ appeal to the persistence of the free, autono-
mous individual in the face of the “juggernaut of modernity” is an act of
optimistic bad faith, where Giddens, an optimistic modernist, refuses to
accept the darker implications of modernity (which, in fact, he always rec-
ognizes).11 For Mestrovic, Giddens cannot accept the implications of his
own theory or the reality of modern society, which substantially curtail indi-
vidual freedom. The subordinate individualist element in structurationist
7. Giddens, The Constitution of Society, op. cit., p. 19.
8. See Alex Callinicos “Anthony Giddens: a Contemporary Critique” in Theory
and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1985), pp. 133-166 and Margaret Archer “Morphogenesis
versus Structuration: on Combining Structure and Action” in The British Journal of Soci-
ology, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 456-483.
9. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., p. 56.
10. See Nigel Pleasants “Free to Act Otherwise? A Wittgensteinian Deconstruction
of the Concept of Agency in Contemporary Social and Political Theory,” in History of the
Human Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1998), pp. 1-28.
11. Stepjan Mestrovic, Anthony Giddens: the Last Modernist (London: Routledge,
1998), pp. 4, 23, 78 and 155.
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theory becomes dominant in his later work, where the claim that individuals
“could have acted otherwise” becomes the focus. As the liberated individual
becomes central, Giddens himself becomes an apologist for post-Fordism.
Post-Fordism
By the mid-1970s, the Keynesian and Fordist systems of regulation
and production were becoming obsolete. As the long post-war boom
ended, the consumer market became saturated, multinationals became
increasingly dominant, and Western states found themselves unable to
manage the economy and to mediate between labor and capital. As Hayek
argued, Keynesian efforts to sustain full employment stimulated inflation,
which jeopardized the very jobs the state was meant to defend. The mas-
sive inflation caused by the 1972-73 oil crises rendered Fordism and Key-
nesianism unviable and, from the mid- to late-1970s, there was a move
toward new post-Fordist regimes, at the forefront of which were Reagan-
ite America and Thatcherite Britain.12 Although it is dangerous to differ-
entiate too sharply between this post-Fordist transformation and the
Fordist era, there have been certain broad changes, which can be charac-
terized as comprising four main elements. In terms of production, the
post-Fordist era is marked by flexible specialization in increasingly domi-
nant multinational corporations, although the extent of this shift has been
debated.13 Politically, there has been a shift away from Keynesian man-
agement to neo-liberal laissez-faire, where state involvement in the econ-
omy has been reduced by deregulation and privatization.14 Socially, the
key transformation has been the development of a one-third, two-thirds
society, where notions of Keynesian universality have been rejected,
since it has been recognized that an all but permanently unemployed
underclass has become unavoidable.15 Culturally, there has been a shift
12. For general accounts of the Fordist and post-Fordist regimes and the transforma-
tion to post-Fordism, see Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, eds., New Times (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1990).
13. See Michel Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York:
Basic Books, 1984).
14. See David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society (London: Jonathon Cape,
1988); Andrew Gamble, The Free Market and the Strong State (London: Macmillan,
1988); Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, eds., The Politics of Thatcherism (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1983); Bob Jessop et al., Thatcherism (Cambridge: Polity, 1988).
15. See Linda Mcdowell, Philip Sarre and Chris Hamnett, eds., Divided Nation (Lon-
don: Hodder and Staughton, 1989); Will Hutton, The State We’re In (London: Vintage,
1996); Ash Amin and Anders Malmberg, “Competing Structural and Institutional Influence
on the Geography of Production in Europe.” in Amin, Post-Fordism: A Reader, op.cit.
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away from a restrictive Protestant ethic toward hedonism and consump-
tion.16 Individual choice has increasingly been emphasized in debates
informing these four major transformations, as opposed to the corporatist
solidarity dominant during the postwar period.
For Lash and Urry, “this accelerating individualization process is a pro-
cess in which agency is set free from structure and it is a structural change
itself in modernization that, so to speak, forces agency to take on powers
that heretofore lay in the social structures themselves. . . Structural change
in the economy forces the individual to be freed from the structural rigidity
of the Fordist labor process.”17 They highlight the fragmentation of the
Fordist economy that has increased the numbers of individuals employed in
the service industry, facilitating the consumption of symbolic goods con-
cerned with the creation of identity, which, in light of class and gender
decomposition, has become more negotiable. The development of elaborate
post-Fordist markets has expanded the consumer choices of affluent indi-
viduals. Increasingly, economic and social policy, as well as personal social
relations, have been justified by, and understood in terms of the sanctity of
individual autonomy. Thus, although most modern post-Fordist countries
are not the most individualistic, Western states increasingly deploy the
rhetoric of the individual to justify post-Fordist transformations.18
The Later Giddens
Since 1987, Giddens’ concerns have shifted from the dense theoreti-
cal discussions of earlier periods, to a focus on the defining characteristics
16. See Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism
(London: Verso, 1991); Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism,
(Cambridge: Polity, 1987), pp. 5 and 14; Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Lon-
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964).
17. Scott Lash and John Urry, Economies of Signs and Space. (London: Sage,
1994), p. 5.
18. Ibid., p.108. Lash and Urry overstate the point when they argue that “Anglo-
American consumption is much more modern, individualized and reflexive than its Japanese
and German counterparts,” when, in fact, the service orientation of the British and American
economies should be interpreted not as a vindication of modernity, but rather as a testament
to these nations’ uncompetitive manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, their argument about
the increasing individualization which occurs as a result of the development of these very
sophisticated methods of “sign-value” marketing does reflect the direction of neoliberal,
post-Fordist reforms. Nowhere is emphasis on the individual clearer than in the Thatcherite
reforms of Britain in the 1980s, each of which was explicitly justified by appealing to the
greater efficiency and equity of individual initiative and reward. Thatcher announced this
new allegiance to the autonomous individual when she declared that “there is no such thing
as society — only individuals and families.” See The Times (January 19, 1985).
66 ANTHONY KING
of late modernity.19 For Giddens, modernity involves the disembedding of
relations from local settings and their stretching across time and space. In
light of new methods of communication, face-to-face relations of pre-mod-
ern societies have been replaced by long-distance relations.20 This disem-
bedding of relations has become a crucial feature of globalized, late or high
modern society, as he calls it, and has produced new forms of risk and
trust.21 Giddens has rejected many of the terms often applied to post-1970s
society, such as post-industrialism, because, he argues, industry is still cen-
tral to economic production, and postmodernism: the term refers to “aspects
of aesthetic reflection” and exaggerates the rift with modern culture.22 
Giddens defines post-traditional society primarily by its opposition to
a traditional one. Accordingly, a traditional society is characterized by a
stifling allegiance to the past, which legitimates action and prevents
change. In traditional society, guardians, who are seen to have sole access
to truth, protect and sustain traditions.23 Since modernity and late moder-
nity are post-traditional societies, traditional societies are all those societ-
ies that have existed across the globe before the great European
transformation of the 18th and 19th centuries.24 Giddens does try to qual-
ify this claim, writing that “in even the most traditional of societies not all
things are traditional,”25 but, although he concedes that no society is com-
pletely traditional,26 he nevertheless insists that late modernity is the most
radical social form and the least dependent on tradition. Yet, the notion of
post-traditionalism is problematic. It is not even clear that late modernity
is less traditional than other cultures for, as Giddens notes, traditions cre-
ated by the Enlightenment and European Christian culture are still very
influential.27 Moreover, it is not clear that any society is traditional in the
way he caricatures non-Western and pre-modern cultures. These cultures
19. Alexander has satirically called this “Giddens lite.” See Alexander, “Critical
Reflections,” op.cit., p.135. See also Mestrovic, Anthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 149.
20. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991);
Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 4.
21. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, op.cit., p. 7.
22. Ibid., pp. 45-6 and 150. Giddens has never employed, but also never dismissed,
the term post-Fordism.
23. Anthony Giddens, “Living in a Post-Traditional Society,” in Ulrich Beck,
Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization (Cambridge: Pol-
ity,1994), pp.75 and 84.
24. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, op. cit., p. 4.
25. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, op.cit., p. 80.
26. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, op. cit., p. 48; The Consequences of
Modernity, op.cit, 37.
27. Mestrovic, Anthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 2.
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are also dynamic and critical, wherein tradition rarely, if ever, has the
deadening effect Giddens assumes. At any rate, those practices taken to
be immemorial are often only recent inventions conveniently mytholo-
gized by dominant groups.28 Thus, any definition of society as traditional
becomes problematic. Despite his qualifications of the idea of tradition,
Giddens refuses to see that, in the end, they undermine reified appeals to
tradition and post-tradition, which are essential to his later work. Societies
cannot be meaningfully classified in this fashion, since the terms “tradi-
tion” and “post-tradition” merely formalize assertive, cursory understand-
ings of the societies in question, without revealing anything of their
organization and culture. The terms “traditional” and “post-traditional”
conceal and legitimate cursory, even personal evaluations of past and
present social forms. 
There are serious difficulties with the term “post-traditionalism.” Its
real significance, however, lies in the kind of individual it implies. This
new individual is the core of Giddens’ later writings. “In many pre-mod-
ern contexts, individuals (and humanity as a whole) were more powerless
than they are in modern settings. People typically lived in smaller groups
and communities; but smallness is not the same as power. In many small-
group settings individuals were relatively powerless to alter or escape
from their surrounding social circumstances. The hold of tradition was
more or less unchallenged.”29 In post-traditional society, the individual is
no longer committed to one tradition, nor restricted to ascribed social
relations. Consequently, post-traditionalism facilitates the development of
individual reflexivity. Since it is no longer obvious what individuals
should do or be, they must consider their options and make choices about
what they should do; they are truly “free to do otherwise.” Individuals
must reconstitute their self-identity reflexively. “The more tradition loses
hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of a dialectical inter-
play between local and global, the more individuals are forced to negoti-
ate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options.”30
No longer constrained by tradition, but now exposed to a vast array
provided by global capitalism, individuals have to decide what kind of
persons they will be. “The self is seen as a reflexive project, for which
individuals are responsible. We are not what we are, but what we make
28. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
29. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, op.cit., p. 192.
30. Ibid., p. 5
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of ourselves.”31 While much of Giddens’ work suggests that the emer-
gence of this personal reflexivity is emancipatory, he does point out the
negative side; i.e., that the emphasis on personal choice raises the prob-
lem of existential doubt and ontological insecurity.32 If personhood is
no longer grounded in the authority of tradition, which “sequesters” all
sorts of potentially dangerous practices, and gives life an automatic
meaning,33 then individuals must personally ground their lives. They
have to quell existential doubt and to establish ontological security
through the creation of personal routines. Late modernity facilitates the
development of reflexivity by expanding the choices individuals can
make, but this expansion of choice and loss of traditional authority also
produces Durkheimian anomie.
Crucially, the arena in which individuals establish their identities is
no longer work but lifestyle: “A lifestyle involves a cluster of habits and
orientations, and hence a certain unity which is important to a continuing
sense of ontological security and that connects options in a more or less
ordered pattern.”34 In late modernity, consumption becomes the key area
of cultural meaning and individual expression. Although Giddens is
oblique about the origins of this new primacy of consumption, it can be
inferred from his writing. “In a post-traditional social universe, reflexively
organized, permeated by abstract system in which the reordering of time
and space realigns the local with the global, the self undergoes massive
changes. Modernity confronts the individual with a complex diversity of
choice.”35 Whereas, in traditional societies, patterns of consumption were
more or less obvious and were created and sustained locally, the develop-
ment of new forms of production and marketing have dissolved those
local practices and have introduced new ones that originate elsewhere in
the world, and the individual can now freely choose.
In light of this centrality of individual autonomy, Giddens rejects Key-
nesianism, which he sees faltering, because it “presumes a citizenry with
more stable lifestyle habits than are characteristic of the globalized uni-
verse of high reflexivity.”36 In this new world, the Keynesian direction of
the economy, which sought to manipulate demand in line with collective
31. Ibid., p. 75.
32. Ibid., pp. 37-9 and 48-55.
33. Ibid., pp. 166-7.
34. Ibid., p. 82.
35. Ibid., p. 80.
36. Ibid., p.42.
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interests and communal values, is untenable. In proposing a radical politics
for this new post-Fordist era of expanded consumer choice, Giddens
rejects Keynesian collectivism in favor of individual reflexivity and free-
dom of choice. This individualistic emphasis on freedom of choice
becomes clearest when he discusses the emergence of a new form of sex-
uality as a central element in the self’s new reflexive practices. According
to Giddens, the sexuality of post-traditional society is distinguishable
from former societies by the fact that sexual practices have become
divorced from biological reproduction. Consequently, the uses of sexual-
ity have been transformed.37
With this severance of sexuality from reproductive needs and the
development of “plastic sexuality,” Giddens envisages the development
of “pure relations” between individuals. These relations of friendship or
“confluent love”38 are the most striking and potentially the most liberat-
ing aspect of post-Fordist society, since individuals are no longer bound
to each other by social and moral obligations, but only by their personal
needs and the pleasure which their open sexual relations mutually pro-
duces. “Giving certain conditions, the pure relationship can provide a
facilitating social environment for the reflexive project of the self.”39
Once individuals have established certain rules of conduct, they can
deploy their sexuality plastically in mutually pleasurable ways. Giddens
is extremely optimistic about the power of the pure relation, and main-
tains that “the transformation of intimacy, together with plastic sexuality,
provides conditions which could bring about a reconciliation of the
sexes.”40 Although Giddens emphasizes the plasticity of sexuality, given
the new individual reflexivity and the vast choices available, the individ-
ual’s entire selfhood becomes plastic. Giddens is extremely optimistic
about post-Fordist society. For him, new technological and institutional
developments have broken the shackles of tradition and have liberated
individuals into a world of choice in which they can freely decide on the
ways in which they can lead their lives and interact with others.
37. Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), p.
34: “Reproduction was once part of nature and heterosexual activity was inevitably its focal
point. Once sexuality has become an ‘integral’ component of social relations, as a result of
changes already discussed, heterosexuality is no longer a standard by which everything else
is judged. We have not yet reached a stage in which heterosexuality is accepted as only one
taste among others, but such is the implication of the socialization of reproduction.”
38. Ibid., pp. 61-2.
39. Ibid., p. 139.
40. Ibid., p. 156.
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Against the Later Giddens
(A) Political Ameliorism. For the most part, Giddens does not dis-
cuss the new conflicts in this emergent social order, but focuses only on
individualist issues of personal identity and relations. However, in his lat-
est publications, Beyond Left and Right and The Third Way, he attempts to
address wider political issues and to lay out a program of post-Fordist
political reform. He does not always ignore the serious problems which
confront contemporary Western politics. He recognizes the current crisis
in the public sector and insists on its reform against neo-liberal demands
for its abolition. Even when he highlights a serious conflict in post-Ford-
ist society, however, he glosses over the nature and scale of these prob-
lems, begging the questions they pose. Thus, he accepts the rightist
critiques of the welfare state, that it is undemocratic and restrictive of per-
sonal liberties, but insists that “a reformed welfare state . . . has to meet
the criteria of social justice, but it has also to recognize and incorporate
lifestyle choice, be integrated with ecological strategies and respond to
new risk scenarios.”41 The sentiments behind these reforms are admira-
ble, but in substance his proposals are mere platitudes far too general to
have any practical application. Although he sometimes accepts the scale
of the problem, his solutions are mere slogans that never seriously address
the crisis. The welfare state and the public sector are subject to pressures
which are the result of large historical transformations. Reform cannot be
achieved by merely being more aware of “lifestyle choices” or trying to
be more “entrepreneurial.” The line of transformation will be determined
by the wider socio-historical context, and Giddens’ role should be to
highlight the kinds of trajectories which that social and historical context
imposes on the welfare state. In the absence of such grounded analysis,
Giddens consistently plays down the seriousness of the political difficul-
ties inherent in the post-Fordist settlement. In so doing, he presents an
overly optimistic description of this society.
This legitimating optimism is particularly obvious when Giddens
announces that the collapse of communism demonstrates that Western
capitalism is the only feasible economic regime today: “No one any
longer has any alternatives to capitalism — the arguments that remain
concern how far, and in what ways, capitalism should be governed and
41. Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 45. Later, on p. 122, he
expands on this: “Benefit systems should be reformed where they induce moral hazard,
and a more active risk-taking attitude encouraged, wherever possible through incentives,
but where necessary by legal obligations.” 
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regulated.”42 His claim that capitalism is the only way is unobjectionable
since, broadly speaking, it simply refers to the fact that, after the collapse of
the USSR, appeals to large-scale state-planning have lost credibility. How-
ever, he assumes that the nature of this “capitalism” is somehow obvious.
As he himself recognizes, however, Western capitalism has undergone a
profound transformation since the 1970s. The capitalism Giddens assumes
to be the only alternative is, in fact, not the capitalism that has existed for
most of the 20th century. He clearly means that post-Fordist, multinational
capitalism is the only viable economic system currently possible, which
necessarily includes the neoliberal regulative regime. However, he then
typically equivocates and insists that what is not decided is how this system
should be regulated, though he has, in fact, already accepted that it should
be. Beyond some vague ideas about extending dialogical democracy to
include personal lifestyles,43 he provides no serious arguments to explain
why capitalism is the only viable option. Moreover, by arguing that post-
Fordist capitalism, including its regime of regulation, is the only option, he
has narrowed the debate over regulation to the smallest possible area. In
saying that post-Fordist capitalism requires only peripheral tampering,
rather than profound and radical democratization, he supports the status
quo. He endorses the current consensus between multinationals, states,
consumers and citizens, instead of recognizing the democratic deficit and
levels of inequality and exploitation in this order. 
(B) The Vindication of the Post-Fordist Individual. Giddens is eager to
differentiate his optimistic descriptions of the post-traditional individual
from neoliberal, rational-choice notions of agency. Citing Ulrich Beck, he
insists that “the new individualism is ‘not Thatcherism, not market indi-
vidualism, nor atomization’.”44 Although he refuses to accept that his
notion of the post-traditional individual has any connection with the
neoliberal entrepreneur, his emphasis on the increasingly autonomous
individual reflects and vindicates the notion of the individual that is widely
drawn upon in political debates. Giddens may differentiate himself from
specifically neoliberal notions of the rational individual, but his post-tradi-
tional individual echoes dominant notions found in neoliberal discourse.
The affinity between Giddens’ post-traditional individual and domi-
nant post-Fordist notions of agency appear at their starkest when his
42. Ibid., pp. 43-4.
43. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), pp. 12 and 18.
44. Giddens, The Third Way, op.cit., p. 36.
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descriptions of contemporary subjectivity are counterposed to alternative
accounts of contemporary individuality. In his analysis of postmodernity,
Frederic Jameson discusses new forms of individuality. He compares Van
Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes (deliberately chosen because they were
the subject of a hermeneutic interpretation by Heidegger) and Andy War-
hol’s Diamond Shoes to demonstrate the difference between the subjec-
tivity of modernity and that which is now becoming dominant. As
Heidegger argued, Van Gogh’s peasant shoes are part of a whole which
they embody and communicate.45 The power of Van Gogh’s painting lies
in the fact that the shoes are embedded in and illuminate the culture that
finds these peasant shoes meaningful; the painting does not merely repre-
sent the shoes as external objects, but illustrates the meaning peasant cul-
ture has within modern culture. For Jameson, the illumination of a
tradition by Van Gogh’s painting presumes a notion of an authentic sub-
ject who is steeped in a tradition and, therefore, the shoes speak to him.
The painting points to the cultural understandings that it shares with the
viewer. Modernist paintings operate around notions of depth and the
search for a higher unity of the subject within a tradition that overcomes
the fragmentation and alienation of modernity.46
By contrast, Warhol’s Diamond Shoes serve no such purpose and
have no such subject in mind. Warhol’s picture is depthless and he “does
not speak to us” and “in no way completes the hermeneutic gesture.”47
Rather, Warhol’s painting announces and presupposes a new kind of sub-
ject.48 With this repudiation of depth goes the transcendence of the sub-
ject’s alienation in favor of the mere fragmentation of the subject.49 The
postmodern subject becomes a mere surface on which commodified
images play and in which the individual disappears under a pastiche of
trivial styles. Instead of being the deepest expression of human individu-
ality, the human body becomes a glossy skin for postmodern fetishization.
For Jameson, this fragmentation of the now flattened subject is logically
consonant with postmodern capitalism. The fragmentation of the subject
widens the forms of consumption in which individuals can now engage,
because they are no longer burdened by a sense of authentic selves tied to
particular social traditions with others. The flattened subject implied by
45. Frederic Jameson, “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” in Postmodernism,
or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 6-7.
46. Ibid., p. 14.
47. Ibid., p. 8.
48. Ibid., p. 12.
49. Ibid., p. 14.
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Warhol’s shoes is the appropriate self, unconstrained by emotional or
social attachments to a wider tradition.
There are important parallels between Jameson’s notion of the post-
modern, fragmented subject and Giddens’ post-traditional plastic sub-
ject. For both, the new form of subjectivity is rendered possible by
globalized markets. But this subjectivity also assists in the development
of multinational capitalism, which has produced a vast panoply of new
commodities. For both Giddens and Jameson, the subject is no longer
committed to an authentic life-style through embeddedness in tradition.
Subjects no longer find their place in communally meaningful activity
but freely indulge in personally and temporally pleasurable activities,
like plastic sexuality. For the postmodern, post-traditional subject, mean-
ing is the pleasure provided by consumption. Yet, where Jameson looks
critically on the new fragmented and flattened subject as an obliteration
of meaning and an incarceration by economic forces, Giddens celebrates
this transition as a liberation. While Jameson criticizes contemporary
culture, Giddens’ later writing celebrates an individuality which echoes
dominant notions of the consuming individual and which is only possible
within post-Fordist capitalism. By highlighting this putative emancipa-
tion, Giddens persistently obscures those exploitative aspects which
make that individualistic emancipation possible.
Giddens’ blindness toward the political and economic context and,
therefore, to relations of power which give rise to the post-traditional indi-
vidual, is nowhere more clear than in his engagement with Foucault’s
writings on sexuality. Foucault insists that even the most apparently inti-
mate sexual practices are inevitably contoured by social discourses
embodying power: individual sexuality is only constituted through the
wider networks of power-knowledge, which make any particular set of
intimate relations possible. “We must not make the mistake of thinking
that sex is an autonomous agency which secondarily produces manifold
effects of sexuality over the entire length of its surface of contact with
power. On the contrary, sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most
internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its
grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations and
pleasures.”50 Giddens rejects this thesis. He claims that Foucault’s notion
of power as permeating society implies that power is independent of
50. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, An Introduction, tr.by Robert Hurley
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 55.
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human agency.51 In point of fact, although Foucault sometimes writes as
if power were indeed separate from individual relations, there is little
doubt that Foucault intends to ground power in relations: “For let us not
deceive ourselves; if we speak of structures of mechanisms of power, it is
only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over oth-
ers. The term ‘power’ designates relations between partners.”52 
Having wrongly accused Foucault of separating power from agency,
Giddens returns to the very atomistic and solipsistic account of sex that
Foucault’s analysis of sexuality was intended to undermine. Against Fou-
cault’s location of modern sexuality within networks of power relations
between individuals, Giddens describes the emergence and transformation
of modern sexuality in wholly individualist terms. For Giddens, the devel-
opment of 19th century bourgeois sexual practices was the outgrowth of
personal reflexivity, whereby individuals sought to gain greater control
over their lives.53 Individuals sequestered the experience of sex in the pri-
vate domestic sphere through reflexive attempts to gain control over them-
selves and their reproduction. The development of contraception was a
widespread example of this reflexive project of the self, and Giddens
regards the dramatic change in sexual attitudes in the 1960s as the triumph
of this emancipating reflexivity. Even the problems modern reflexive indi-
viduals face in their sexual practices are personal, indicative of ontological
security and existential doubt — “the feeling that one is worthless, one’s
life is empty and one’s body is an inadequate device”54 — rather than
social issues of exclusion, subordination or exploitation. For Giddens, Fou-
cault underplays individual autonomy, and fails to recognize the genuinely
emancipatory advances individuals have made, which Giddens persistently
attempts to rectify by a rigorously individualistic account of sexuality.
In fact, Giddens’ account of the transformation of sexuality as the
growth of individual reflexivity presupposes the very social conditions
Foucault highlights. The development of contraception was not primarily
the outgrowth of a myriad of personal decisions, but its adoption in the pri-
vate sphere was the result of wider public debates about sexuality, includ-
ing the state’s concern with social order and population or, as Foucault
puts it, with “bio-power.” Giddens occasionally recognizes that this wider
51. Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, op. cit., pp. 24 and 171-173
52. Michel Foucault, “Afterword: The Subject and Power,” tr. by Leslie Sawyer, in
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Herme-
neutics (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester, 1982), p. 217.
53. Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, op. cit., pp.175-182.
54. Ibid., p. 175.
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context is an essential element in the constitution of sexuality. Thus, hav-
ing argued that the key factor in the development of modern sexuality was
individual reflexivity, he reverses his position: “The sequestering of sexu-
ality occurred largely as a result of social rather than psychological
repression and concerned two things above all: the confinement or denial
of female sexual responsiveness and the generalized acceptance of male
sexuality as unproblematic.”55
Confirming that individual female (and by extension, male) sexuality
was constituted by the wider social context and, therefore, by the general
distribution of power relations, Giddens concedes that “the repressions of
the Victorian era and after were in some respects all too real.”56 In the
end, Giddens’ has to draw on the very Foucauldian account of sexuality
he putatively rejects, in order to sustain his own flawed theory of individ-
ualistically-created sexuality. Given that sexuality has always been con-
stituted through wider social networks, which include elements of power,
it is naïve to assume that the transformations of sexual attitudes in the
1960s can be read off as evidence of increasing individual freedom. Like
Victorian sexuality, contemporary practices are created by wider social,
political and economic networks. To claim that current sexual practices
simply free the individual is to legitimate those institutions which have, if
anything, overtaken the state in their documentation and discussion of all
manner of sexual performance.
Giddens never seriously considers the implications of the socio-his-
torical construction of intimacy, but sees it as a secluded lagoon which
has silted itself off from the political and social context. Even when he
sees the connection, he typically fails to recognize its import. Indeed, he
goes to some length to disconnect contemporary sexual practices from
wider social and economic circumstances. Thus, Giddens dismisses the
link between sexuality and the market, because “there is plenty of evi-
dence that sexuality is worrying, disturbing, fraught with tensions. Plea-
sure is hedged about with too many countervailing tendencies to make
plausible the idea that sexuality forms the centerpoint of a hedonistic
consumer society.”57 While sexuality can stimulate feelings of insecurity
and uncertainty, the claim that sexuality is too disturbing to be central to
consumer society is contradicted by Giddens’ counterclaim in the preced-
ing paragraph that, “sexuality generates pleasure; and pleasure, or at least
55. Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, op. cit., pp. 177-8.
56. Ibid., p. 23.
57. Ibid., pp. 176-7.
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the promise of it, provides a leverage for marketing goods in capitalistic
society. Sexual imagery appears almost everywhere in the marketplace as
a sort of gigantic selling ploy.”58 The celebratory use of such sexual
imagery in advertising campaigns does not preclude personal anxieties
about sex. But these images trade on ideal notions of sexual performance
and gratification, and their message is that the consumer’s sexual insecu-
rities will be erased by the purchase of some particular commodity. Once
again, Giddens accepts at one moment what he rejects at another. He rec-
ognizes that any contemporary form of intimacy is bound up with the
wider context, but he consistently and paradoxically denies this fact and
insists that personal sexuality can be devolved from wider economic
flows. In this, his vindication of the post-Fordist individual echoes his
political ameliorism, for he inevitably fails to consider the implications of
the social realities that he fleetingly recognizes. 
Although Giddens generally disconnects the post-traditional individ-
ual from the system, in his later writing he occasionally recognizes that
there is a direct link between individual choice and wider global markets.
At these moments, however, his vindication of the post-Fordist era is not
called into question. On the contrary, since the system facilitates the
development of lagoons of personal pleasure, the system is seen as
unproblematically liberating. The post-traditional individual is, at certain
moments, seen as not only the product of globalization, but also essential
to the reproduction of the system in typical structurationist fashion. Con-
sequently, Giddens argues that “the overriding stress of the book [Moder-
nity and Self-Identity] is on the emergence of new mechanisms of self-
identity which are shaped by — yet also shape — the institutions of
modernity.”59 The post-traditional individual adopts practices appropriate
to wider institutional realities and simultaneously reproduces the very sys-
tems that were the medium of action in the first place. The emancipatory
potential of post-Fordism is unproblematically tied to the reproduction of
its political-economic structure. The liberated individual now reproduces
a system that thrives on the emancipation of the plastic individual. 
This is not to deny that certain forms of freedom and fulfillment are
possible within post-Fordist society, as they are in any social form. But Gid-
dens persistently underemphasizes the intense political and economic strug-
gles in favor of a celebration of private, sexual relations. By highlighting the
putative development of new forms of private freedom, where individuals
58. Ibid., p. 176.
59. Ibid., p. 2.
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can always do otherwise, he becomes the key apologist for post-Fordist
modes of domination. Consequently, Nietzsche’s rejection of the “the whole
of sociology in England and France” a century ago “because it knows from
experience only the decaying forms of society and takes its own decaying
instincts with perfect innocence as the norm of sociological value judge-
ment”60 is still valid for Giddens today. Given his Parsonesque prominence
on the international academic stage, such facile vindication of contemporary
social life marks a serious and widespread retreat from critique.
Conclusion
Giddens’ later writings are inseparable from the social order he seeks
to analyze. They are not so much a critical analysis of post-Fordist
regimes as their vindication, for even when he identifies the central con-
flicts in this society, he fails to recognize their import. In particular, he
normalizes the idea of the individual as a freely choosing agent, which is
a central motif in contemporary culture. It would be equally reprehensible
to go the other way, as some Marxists do, and insist that post-Fordism is
an essentially exploitative order systematically denying all individual ful-
fillment. This makes a mockery of the widespread consent this social
form has commanded. However, it is also necessary to recognize when
theories become part of the social reality they describe, and uncritically
support the values of the historical period of which they are a product.
As Gadamer has argued, it may be impossible to transcend one’s his-
torical conditions, and all that can be achieved through a fusion of hori-
zons is an effective historical consciousness.61 Yet, by demonstrating the
unrecognized link between Giddens’ later writings and the historical
period in which he writes, it may be possible to provide a more self-con-
scious and historically-aware account, even though it will not transcend all
historical prejudices. Ironically, Giddens’ later writings fail to perform the
very role of reflexive self-criticism he marks out as the distinguishing fea-
ture of “post-traditional culture.” They do not question the social order
which gives rise to them, but unintentionally reproduce the very traditions
of which they are a part. Giddens has become one of those guardians of
the truth and tradition that reflexive modernization has rendered obsolete.
60. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, tr. by R. J. Hollingdale (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 91.
61. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr. by Garrett Barden and Johan Cum-
ming (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), p. 273.
